Is a dead battery to blame for the Gulf Coast oil spill?

NEWS RELEASE

CONGRESSMAN BART STUPAK 1ST CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

************************* Stupak statement on Deepwater Horizon Gulf Coast oil spill

WASHINGTON, DC - U.S. Congressman Bart Stupak, chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee’s subcommittee on oversight and investigations, today held a hearing to examine the causes of the Deepwater Horizon rig explosion on April 20 and subsequent oil spill. 

The hearing, entitled Inquiry into the Deepwater Horizon Gulf Coast Oil Spill, addressed the adequacy of safety measures and the emergency response to the incident, and the status of recovery efforts. 

This is the third hearing Stupak has held as chairman of oversight and investigations involving British Petroleum. 

Stupak has investigated several spills in BP’s North Slope, Alaska drilling, including the 2006 spill that resulted in more than 200,000 gallons of oil leaking into the tundra, as well as BP’s 2005 Texas City refinery explosion that killed 15 and injured more than 170. 

Stupak delivered the following statement:

Three years ago – almost to the day – this subcommittee held a hearing into British Petroleum’s disasters at Texas City and on the North Slope of Alaska. 

The 2005 Texas City refinery explosion resulted in the deaths of 15 workers and injured more than 170 people. 

As a result of that accident and BP’s failure to correct potential hazards faced by employees at Texas City, OSHA has twice slapped BP with record setting fines totaling more than $100 million. 

Several reports criticized management at the Texas City facility including BP’s own 2007 report of the management accountability project which stated “a culture that evolved over the years seemed to ignore risk, tolerated non-compliance and accepted incompetence.”

In March of 2006 BP discovered their pipeline on Alaska’s North Slope had spilled more than 200,000 gallons of oil on the tundra, making it the largest spill in North Slope history. 

Our hearings discovered that significant cost cutting measures resulted in decreased maintenance and inspections of the pipeline and BP’s management culture deterred individuals from raising safety concerns. 

Since our last hearing, BP has experienced continued problems on the North Slope:

- September 29, 2008 an eight-inch high pressure gas line at the Y-Pad location “separated” sending three pieces of pipe to the tundra. One segment of the pipe landed 900 feet from the pipeline. Roughly 30 minutes later a second and unrelated incident occurred on the S Pad where there was a gas release. 

- January 15, 2009 a disc cleaning pig became lodged and lost in a 34-inch oil transit line during de-oiling, allowing gas to pass around the pig and travel through Skid 50, to Pump Station 1 causing a significant venting of gas to the atmosphere and the complete shutdown of the Trans Alaska Pipeline for a period of time. 

- October 10, 2009 at the Central Compressor Plant low pressure flare staging valves were stuck closed causing gas to travel to the backup low pressure flare valves, which activated causing the gas to vent to the atmosphere which could have caused an explosion. 

- November 29, 2009 an 18-inch three-phase common line near the Lisburne Production Center carrying a mixture of crude oil, produced water and natural gas ruptured spraying its contents over an estimated 8,400 square feet area.

In addition to these pipeline incidents there have been several personal injury accidents where employees have been seriously injured or killed as was the tragic case of Mike Phalen on November 18 last year when he was crushed between the pipeline and a truck.

Today we are here to investigate the latest BP tragedy, one which has resulted in the apparent loss of 11 lives and is well on its way to becoming the largest oil spill in our nation’s history. 

Let me take a moment on behalf of the entire committee to convey our deepest sympathies to the family, friends and coworkers of those 11 individuals lost on that fateful day.

On April 20 an explosion and fire occurred on the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig which BP was leasing to drill an exploratory well in the Gulf of Mexico. 

The rig was owned and operated by Transocean, the world’s largest offshore drilling company and was under contract from BP. 

On April 22 the rig capsized and sank to the floor of the ocean resulting in oil leaks from three separate locations among the twisted wreckage. 

The world is wondering what went wrong to allow explosive gas to shoot out of the drill pipe on the Deepwater Horizon causing the explosion. 

We heard Chairman Waxman discuss theories of what may have gone wrong in the well (down hole as they call it) and what went wrong on the rig. 

I would like to take a few minutes to discuss issues related to the blowout preventer (BOP) which was the “fail safe system” to cut off the flow of oil and gas to the rig. 

In his testimony today, Lamar McKay, the president of BP America, says that blowout preventers are “intended to … be fail-safe.” 

But that didn’t happen. 

The blowout preventer used by the Deepwater Horizon rig failed to stop the flow of gas and oil, the rig exploded, and an enormous oil spill is now threatening the Gulf Coast. 

We know that the blowout preventer, the BOP, did not properly engage. 

The BOP has multiple rams that are supposed to slam shut to pinch off any flow around the drill pipe and stop the flow of oil from the well. 

There are also shear rams in the BOP that are supposed to cut and seal the pipe to prevent oil and gas from flowing. 

The question we will ask is why did these rams fail? 

Our investigation is at its early stages, but already we have uncovered at least four significant problems with the blowout preventer used on the Deepwater Horizon drill rig. 

First, the blowout preventer apparently had a significant leak in a key hydraulic system.

This leak was found in the hydraulic system that provides emergency power to the shear rams, which are the devices that are supposed to cut the drill pipe and seal the well.

I would like to put on the screen a document that the Committee received from BP.

This document states: “Leaks have been discovered in the BOP hydraulics system.”

The blowout preventer was manufactured by Cameron.

We asked a senior official at Cameron what he knew about these leaks.

He told us when the remote operating vehicles (ROVs) tried to operate the shear rams, they noticed a loss of pressure.

They investigated this by injecting dye into the hydraulic fluid, which showed a large leak coming from a loose fitting, which was backed off several turns.

The Cameron official told us that he did not believe the leak was caused by the blowout because every other fitting in the system was tight.

To continue reading Bart Stupak's statement, click here