BREAKING: Algoma Steel pleads guilty to 2019 cyanide spill during power outage

Algoma Steel was fined $150,000 Wednesday for allowing byproducts from steel operations to enter the St. Marys River in October, 2019.

The steelmaker pleaded guilty and must also pay a 25 per cent victim impact surcharge.

"Algoma Steel was fully cooperative in the investigation," says Laura Devoni, Algoma's director of corporate affairs and sustainability.

"The spill occurred following a large-scale power outage, despite our immediate actions to implement critical safety and environmental protection measures," Devoni said.

"We continue to accept full responsibility for the incident and have enhanced safety mechanisms to mitigate the risk of a spill in the event of future power outages."

"As we advance these plans across our organization, we are learning from the past to strengthen our operation today and into the future," Devoni said.

The following is the full text of an agreed statement of facts from Algoma Steel and the Ontario Ministry of Environment, Conservation and Parks:

**********************
The parties hereby agree on the following statement of facts with respect to this proceeding:

1. Algoma Steel Inc. (“ASI”) is an entity existing under the Ontario Business Corporations Act.

2. ASI owns and operates a facility that manufactures steel products (including sheet and plate) and produces raw materials required in the manufacture of those steel products (including coke, iron, and lime). ASI’s facility is located at 105 West Street, Sault Ste. Marie (the “Facility”). 

The Cokemaking By-Products Area (the “BP Area”)

3. The Facility includes ASI’s cokemaking operations. These cokemaking operations require coke oven batteries to be superheated to extremely high temperatures. Raw liquor is employed to cool the coke oven batteries. If the coke oven batteries are not properly and continuously cooled, coke oven gas will become over-pressurized, which can result in fires, explosions, the uncontrolled release of coke gases into the environment and other environmental harm and safety hazards.

4. As part of the cokemaking process, the raw liquor that is used to cool the coke oven batteries is exposed to coke oven gases, generating various by-products. The BP Area, which is located on the north-west side of the Facility, supports ASI’s cokemaking operations by managing these by-products, as follows:

(a) After raw liquor is used to cool the coke oven batteries, it is delivered to tar decanters and tar running tanks in order to separate tar from raw liquor.

(b) Raw liquor is then transferred via a series of pumps to two storage tanks known as the north raw liquor tank (the “NRLT”) and the south raw liquor tank (the “SRLT”), with a combined capacity of 720,000 imperial gallons (approximately 3.3 million litres). This raw liquor is stored in these tanks for future re-use.

(c) Excess raw liquor and wastewater is then pumped from these tanks and treated to remove ammonia and phenols, before being pumped to ASI’s Main Water Filtration Plant (the “MWFP”). Processed effluent from all sources within the Facility is then discharged from the MWFP to the St. Mary’s River, as permitted by ASI’s Environmental Compliance Approval (ECA No. 4-0196-88-907).

The October 18, 2019 Incident

5. On October 18, 2019 at approximately 1:17 a.m., a steam pipe used in ASI’s cokemaking operations spontaneously ruptured, causing steam to infiltrate into an electrical room in the BP Area. The electrical room housed a junction for both the primary and back-up power sources for the cokemaking operations. The steam infiltration cut off access to both power sources, causing a power outage throughout the cokemaking operations, including within the BP Area. The ruptured pipe also cut off access to steam power, which is used as a limited tertiary power source for some systems in the BP Area.

6. ASI personnel were immediately alerted to the power outage and secured portable generators from other parts of the Facility to maintain power for the cokemaking operations. These generators were deployed to prioritize maintaining power to certain key cokemaking equipment so as to ensure that the coke oven batteries continued to be properly and continuously cooled. Through this action, the over- pressurization of coke oven gas was prevented and the risk of substantial environmental harm and safety hazards, including the potential consequences identified in paragraph 3, above, was prevented. It was not practical for ASI to cease cokemaking operations during the power outage, given the need to ensure that the coke oven batteries continued to be properly and continuously cooled.

7. Since the generators were deployed in a prioritized fashion to the key cokemaking equipment, there was consequently insufficient power to run all of the equipment in the BP Area. In particular, power was not available to run the pumps that would normally transfer excess raw liquor from the SRLT to the ammonia and phenols treatment area and then onwards to the MWFP. The NRLT was out of service during this period, resulting in all excess raw liquor being pumped to the SRLT.

8. At the same time, however, because the key cokemaking equipment continued to operate, raw liquor continued to circulate to (and accumulate in) the SRLT. At approximately 9:30 a.m., some of this accumulated raw liquor started to overflow from the SRLT onto the ground. Raw liquor also backed up in the system as a result of the ongoing operation of the cokemaking equipment and started to overflow from the tar running tanks onto the ground.

9. ASI initially reported the power loss to the Spills Action Centre at 5:30 a.m. and provided a further update to the Spills Action Centre at 7:18 a.m. ASI had also contacted Provincial Officer Lori Jalak (the local district officer of the Ministry of the Environment, Conservation and Parks (the “MECP”)), at approximately 7:55 a.m. and 8:27 a.m. to provide updates regarding the power outage. At 10:41 a.m., ASI personnel reported the overflow of raw liquor to Provincial Officer Jalak and requested her assistance. Provincial Officer Jalak attended the BP Area at approximately 11:30 a.m. and left the Facility at approximately 12:15 p.m.

The Drain

10. ASI maintains Spill Prevention and Contingency Plans for the Facility and specifically for the BP Area. These procedures direct personnel to: (a) notify the Spills Action Centre; (b) berm all sewer openings and drains identified in the BP Area Spills Prevention and Contingency Plan (as shown on historic plans prepared in support of previously granted Environmental Compliance Approvals); and (c) deploy vacuum trucks to collect raw liquor.

11. ASI personnel implemented the Spill Prevention and Contingency Plans upon discovering the overflow from the SRLT, berming all known sewer openings and drains and deploying vacuum trucks.

12. In addition, ASI personnel tested a grab sample of effluent from the MWFP. The results of the sampling indicated that despite the berming of all known sewer openings and drains, raw liquor was nevertheless entering the MWFP.

13. ASI personnel immediately further investigated the BP Area and discovered that some of the excess raw liquor that had overflowed to the ground from the tar running tanks had flowed into a drain that ultimately connected to the MWFP (the “Drain”). The Drain was recessed below-grade, underneath grating and beneath a pipe that continuously vented steam. As of October 18, 2019, the Drain was not marked on ASI’s Spill Prevention and Contingency Plans. Once the Drain was discovered, ASI personnel started berming the Drain, starting at approximately 2:00 p.m.

14. However, since the MWFP is not designed to treat raw liquor (which in the normal course, never enters the MWFP), the raw liquor that entered the MWFP mixed with other effluent and a certain quantity of raw liquor was discharged into the St. Mary’s River.

15. In addition to the notifications set out at paragraph 9 above, ASI reported to the Spills Action Centre that raw liquor was being discharged from the MWFP to the St. Mary’s River, soon after ASI began berming the Drain. ASI also again requested Provincial Officer Jalak’s assistance and she attended the BP Area that afternoon.

16. It is unknown precisely when raw liquor first began to flow into the Drain, but the raw liquor had fully ceased entering the Drain by around 4:30 p.m.

17. Following the incident, ASI temporarily plugged (and then subsequently permanently sealed) the Drain.

Environmental Impacts of the Discharge

18. A chemical analysis of the discharged effluent showed that it surpassed the permissible limits with respect to:

(a) phenol at 162.6 kg/day (> 37 times the allowable limit of 4.34 kg);

(b) total cyanide at 58.6 kg/day (>1.6 times the allowable limit of 35.4 kg); and

(c) ammonia at 3109 kg/day (>5 times the allowable limit of 608 kg).

19. One generally accepted scientific test for aquatic toxicity (the “rainbow trout acute lethality test”) involves intentionally exposing rainbow trout to liquid collected from the discharge. A discharge is considered toxic if a certain number of rainbow trout in the test die. This test was performed on a further grab sample of effluent taken from the MWFP on October 18, 2019, and resulted in all of the rainbow trout exposed to the discharge as part of the test dying. The OWRA therefore deems the discharge to impair the quality of water by virtue of Section 1(3)(d).

20. An expert report by Michael Kilemade, an aquatic toxicologist employed at the MECP, which took into account pertinent information (including the reported concentrations of phenol, cyanide and ammonia in the discharge and the results of the rainbow trout acute lethality test), found that the discharge was likely toxic to some aquatic species native to the St. Mary’s River including perch, walleye, whitefish, northern pike, and game fish, such as trout and salmon species.

21. Given the dilution of discharge in the St. Mary’s River (which is a large body of water) it is uncertain whether any members of those species were actually harmed in this case. No dead fish, other than the test rainbow trout fish referred to above, were observed. Equally, no other adverse effects were observed.

22. Nevertheless, the discharge is considered unlawful on the basis that the OWRA prohibits a discharge that “may impair the quality of the water”.

Conclusion

23. ASI voluntarily and fully cooperated with the MECP’s investigation in this matter, including providing voluntary disclosure, communicating with MECP officers, and answering all written questions from the investigator.

24. In addition, ASI is currently refurbishing a two million gallon tank (approximately 7.5 million litres) to be connected via a pipeline to the BP Area. Once complete, raw liquor in the NRLT and SRLT can be pumped to the refurbished tank before an overflow can occur, thereby reducing the risk of future spills.

25. Further, ASI has since replaced the NRLT, which will also enhance ASI’s ability to effectively store large quantities of raw liquor.

26. ASI pleads guilty to discharging effluent containing raw liquor into the St. Mary’s River, which is deemed to impair the quality of the St. Mary’s River, contrary to Section 30(1) of the OWRA. This is ASI’s first offence under environmental laws and regulations since it took over operations from a prior operator on July 20, 2018.